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Abstract
Voting for radical right-wing parties has been associated most strongly with national
identity threats. In Europe, this has been framed by the radical right in terms of
mass-migration and European integration, or other politicians bargaining away national
interests. Perhaps surprisingly given the radical right’s nationalist ideology, nationalistic
attitudes are hardly included in empirical research on the voting behaviour. In this
contribution, we test to what extent various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes
affect radical right voting, next to the earlier and new assessed effects of perceived
ethnic threat, social distance to Muslims, Euroscepticism and political distrust. The
findings show that national identification, national pride and an ethnic conception of
nationhood are additional explanations of radical right voting. National identification’s
effect on radical right voting is found to be stronger when populations on average
perceive stronger ethnic threat.
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Introduction
It has been often assessed that the radical right in contemporary Europe is nation-
alist in its ideology. Mudde (2007) describes the ideologist position as one
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of ‘nativism’, implying that radical right-wing parties propose to keep the nation
state population native, and that non-native elements are threatening the homogen-
eity of the nation state. In somewhat diﬀerent terms, Rydgren (2007) labelled the
radical right-wing ideology as one of ‘ethno-pluralism’. In this ideology, diﬀerences
between cultures are emphasized, and to preserve perceived national unique features,
diﬀerent cultures should stay apart and should not mix, because that would lead to
extinguish of the unique cultural characteristics. At the one hand, the uniqueness of
the nation–state is stressed, and at the other hand, the threats against which the
nation–state should be protected. Radical right-wing programs mostly open with
questions on and perceived threats to national identity. The Flemish Interest party
proclaims that it is ‘a Flemish-nationalist party. . . implying that the cultural identity
of our people are decisive for the creation and government of the state’. The German
NDP (Nationaldemokratische) claims that national identity means that ‘Germany
should remain the country of the Germans, and should, in places where this no
longer is the case, become it again’. And the Dutch Party for Freedom claimed in
the ﬁrst paragraph of the election program from 2010 that ‘The Dutch do not have
their equals. We are born from a ﬁght for freedom. Our ancestors have turned this
delta marsh in a country that is envied by the whole world’.
Empirical research on the predictors of a radical right-wing vote hardly
addressed the role of the nationalist part of the ideology. It focused much more
on the role of attitudes towards issues that are claimed to be related to threats to
the nation. First, researchers studied the role of attitudes towards migrants and
integration (e.g. Ivarsﬂaten, 2005, 2008; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2008; Van der Brug
et al., 2000) and second, studies turned to the role of euro-scepticism (e.g. Werts
et al. 2012). These ideologically related explanations turned out to exist next to
political protest explanations such as political distrust or political cynicism
(Ivarsﬂaten, 2008; Werts et al., 2012). Measurements of nationalistic attitudes to
explain radical right-wing voting have hardly been included, possibly because most
of the international studies rely on cross-national datasets such as the European
Social Surveys and Eurobarometers in which measures on nationalism lack. In the
country case studies where it was included, only a speciﬁc dimension of national-
istic attitudes – i.e. national pride – was studied (Billiet and De Witte, 1995) or it
was not controlled for the relevant other predictors of radical right voting
(Meuleman and Lubbers, 2013). These studies showed that nationalistic attitudes
had at the most a small eﬀect on voting for the radical right. We address the
relation between nationalistic attitudes and a vote for the radical right further in
this contribution. We question whether nationalistic attitudes aﬀect the vote for the
radical right next to attitudes that have previously turned out to be decisive in the
vote for the parties, i.e. perceptions of migrant threat, euro-scepticism and political
distrust. With this approach, we will provide insight into the role of identiﬁcation
with the nation (in comparison to identiﬁcation with Europe or sub-national geo-
graphical units) in voting for the radical right and will discuss whether this iden-
tiﬁcation is a suﬃcient or merely a necessary condition. Relating to other studies
that study the consequences of national identiﬁcation and nationalist attitudes
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(e.g. De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Gibson, 2006), we include measurements for
multiple dimensions of nationalistic attitudes. We demonstrate whether concep-
tions of nationhood that exclude out-groups based on origin aﬀect voting for the
radical right (Rydgren, 2007). With that focus, the contribution shows whether
nationalistic attitudes are the underlying explanations of the eﬀects of perceptions
of migrant threat and euro-scepticism on radical right-voting (Werts et al., 2012).
Moreover, we test the relationship in a cross-national comparative setting, provid-
ing evidence whether a context in which a public opinion is more favourable
towards the radical right, national identiﬁcation is more likely to be positively
related to radical right voting. The results indicate that nationalistic attitudes
aﬀect radical right-wing voting over and beyond ethnic threat, social distance to
Muslims, Euroscepticism and political dissatisfaction, though its eﬀect is modest.
Expectations
The literature has regarded the importance of unfavourable attitudes towards
migrants (e.g. Van der Brug et al., 2000) and euro-scepticism in radical right
voting as support for the idea that people vote because of a nationalist ideology
(e.g. Werts et al., 2012). When migrants or the European Union (EU) are perceived
as an economic, cultural or political threat to the national interests, voters would
favour a party that claims to serve the natives’ in-group interests. The question
remains unanswered whether the radical right mobilizes support because of its
appeal to people who identify strongly with the nation and are patriotic or only
to people who perceive that the national interests are under threat from immigrants
and further European integration. Building on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982;
Tajfel and Turner, 1979), it is claimed that the nation can be one of the relevant
groups that people identify with (e.g. Smith, 2007). When the nation is a more
relevant group for someone’s identity it is to be expected that the nationalist ideol-
ogy of the radical right, referring to the relevance of that group membership, is
supported stronger than when people do not identify with the nation at all. From
this perspective, it seems that national identiﬁcation is a necessary condition to
support parties that proclaim a nationalist ideology, which should lead to the
ﬁnding that among people that do not identify with the nation, voting for the
nationalist parties is absent. We expect that people who do not attach importance
to the nation and do not identify with the nation will be unlikely to vote for a party
with a nationalist agenda.
Hypothesis 1a: People without a positive identiﬁcation with the nation do not vote for
the radical right.
But will stronger identiﬁcation with the nation also have the consequence of stron-
ger support for a nationalist party? Radical right parties deﬁne an out-group in
order to construct a national in-group. Bruter and Harrison (2011) describe this as
the negative conception of identity. Due to the nationalist program of radical right
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parties, we expect that stronger national identiﬁcation induces more interest in and
support for nationalist ideologies, and consequently a larger likelihood to vote
radical right.
Hypothesis 1b: The stronger the identiﬁcation with the nation, the stronger the sup-
port for the radical right.
However, in line with previous research that showed that national identity is not
inherently related to an out-group bias (Brewer, 2001; De Figueiredo and Elkins,
2003; Gibson, 2006), the relation between national identity and radical right voting
might be more complicated. Although nationalistic attitudes and perceptions of
threat to the nation are correlated, love for the country and even perceived super-
iority of the country do not necessarily have to result in perceptions of migrant
threat and euro-scepticism (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). Associations between
nationalistic attitudes and anti-immigration attitudes are far from perfect. And
even though European identiﬁcation is positively associated with positive attitudes
towards migration (Curtis, 2014; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005), others have
shown that the identities are not mutually exclusive. Citrin and Sides (2004) pro-
vide evidence that a (small) proportion of EU citizens hold a dual identity, attach-
ing importance to being a country’s national and European. In accordance with
these ﬁndings, theorists in the Social Identity Theory tradition have stressed that
stronger in-group identiﬁcation does not has to be accompanied with negative
attitudes towards out-groups (Brewer, 1999; Brown, 2000). Brewer argued that
identiﬁcation is a necessary condition but not a suﬃcient condition for intolerance.
The radical right plays both cards in its rhetoric and campaigns: it departs from a
nationalist ideology, stressing the relevance of national identiﬁcation and national
pride, but it does so by framing that its deﬁnition of the national identity is under
threat. To shed more light on this issue, we also address other aspects of nation-
alistic attitudes (national pride and conceptions of nationhood) as well as the
national context in which national identity may be more strongly related to radical
right voting.
Firstly, we take into account pride is one’s nation as another aspect of nation-
alistic attitudes (Ariely, 2012; Solt, 2011). Identiﬁcation does not necessarily have
an evaluative component, whereas pride expresses an explicit positive evaluation of
the nation. We therefore expect that stronger pride in the country is likely to
increase the orientation to parties that address a nationalist ideology.
Hypothesis 2: The more national pride, the more likely the vote for the radical right.
However, here national pride – in the absence of negative identity construction –
may be unrelated to voting for the parties that are built around a nationalist
ideology. De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) showed for the US that patriotism
was not related to levels of prejudice. A similar ﬁnding was reported by Gibson
(2006), showing that stronger sympathy for the in-group in South-Africa did not
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give rise to intolerance. It showed that love for one’s nation is widespread and that
intolerance is just as likely among people with and without pride in the nation.
Again we propose that love for the nation is a necessary condition for voting for a
nationalist party. The radical right strongly relies on nationalist symbols to stress
its love for the nation. People without any love for the nation will therefore be
unlikely to vote for the nationalist party.
Hypothesis 2a: People without national pride do not vote for the radical right.
Secondly, the literature on nationalistic attitudes has further diﬀerentiated between
attitudinal dimensions (Dekker et al., 2003; Hjerm and Schnabel, 2010). This dif-
ferentiation can improve our understanding of the relation between nationalistic
attitudes and radical right voting, and address the question whether these are
inherently interrelated. One relevant distinction is made between civic and ethnic
conceptions of nationhood (Ford et al., 2011; Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens and
Hooghe, 2010; Rydgren, 2007). It focuses on how the nation – as an imagined
community (Anderson, 1983) – is understood. These conceptions contain diﬀerent
views on what characterizes the national in-group and the extent to which national
group membership is deﬁned in a way that excludes migrants. In an ethnic deﬁn-
ition of nationhood, the nation is deﬁned in terms of shared ancestral origins and
cultural homogeneity and distinctiveness. Membership of the national community
is denied to anyone who is not a member of the native majority group. This ethnic
conception of nationhood reﬂects the jus sanguinis (right of blood) principle of
nation-building, according to which citizenship is based on ancestry (Brubaker,
1992). Here, the basis may be found why migrants and the EU are more likely
to be seen as a threat; by the deﬁnition of what nationhood constitutes, people
from other cultural backgrounds are excluded. In contrast, in a civic deﬁnition of
nationhood, membership of the nation does not depend on descent, but on the
willingness to accept the basis rules. Civic nationalism focuses on commitment to
society and participation in society (Smith, 2001). The civic conception of nation-
hood reﬂects the jus soli (right of ground) principle of nation-building, according to
which citizenship is based on living within the national territory.
Ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood are not mutually exclusive; people
may support both types of nationhood (Janmaat, 2006), but it is generally thought
that an ethnic conception of the nation is stronger associated with exclusion of
migrants than a civic conception of the nation (Kunovich, 2009). As Bruter and
Harrison (2011) identify, radical right parties deﬁne the nation by referring to what
the majority shows to have in common, such as history and language. People who
do not share these common features are then excluded from membership. We hence
focus on the criteria that people use to deﬁne the nation.
Hypothesis 3a–c: People who attach more value to (a) common national ancestry, to
(b) being born in the country and to (c) be able to speak the national language for
being truly a member of the nation, are more likely to vote for the radical right.
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As ancestry is the most exclusive criterion to deﬁne nationhood (Rydgren, 2007),
we would expect that this particularly holds for those who attach more value to
common national ancestry.
National public opinion
The discussion on civic and ethnic conceptions of the nationhood has often been
linked to diﬀerent national traditions in dominant ideas of nationhood and oﬃcial
citizenship criteria. Based on citizenship regime traditions, France and Germany
have often been regarded as ideal types of respectively jus soli and jus sanguinis
countries (Brubaker, 1992). However, subjective conceptions of nationhood among
the general public do not necessarily reﬂect the oﬃcial citizenship criteria that are
applied by the state. Furthermore, instead of departing from a dichotomy of ideal
types of nations, we think that populations are aﬀected by the general public
opinion in a country on the conceptions of the nation. We argue that the extent
to which nationalistic public opinions prevail in a country – regarding national
pride and ethnic conceptions of nationhood – aﬀect the relationship between
national identiﬁcation and voting for radical right parties. Since studies into the
relation between national identiﬁcation and intolerance have shown that the asso-
ciation is at the most weak, social identity theorists have stressed the conditionality
under which national identiﬁcation aﬀects intolerance (Brewer, 2001). Gibson
(2006) states that political and social salience of intergroup tension form such a
moderating context. Weldon (2006) showed that laws on citizenship acquisition are
associated to intolerance among the population. Also, Pherson et al. (2009) found
that the relationship between individuals’ level of national identiﬁcation and anti-
immigrant prejudice is moderated by the extent to which people within a country
endorse speciﬁc deﬁnitions of the nation. Hence, to take the role of nationalism in
radical right voting a step further, we also investigate to what extent diﬀerences
between countries in the dominant nationalistic public opinion play a role in the
voting for the radical right. It can be expected that national identiﬁcation is stron-
ger related to support for parties with a nationalistic ideology when people are
encouraged by a public opinion that expresses a strong ethnic perception of the
nationhood.
Hypothesis 4: The more value the population of a country attaches to a common
ancestry as deﬁnition of nationhood, the stronger the positive eﬀect of national iden-
tiﬁcation on the likelihood to vote for radical right parties.
Finally, we anticipate a similar role of the dominant public opinion on migration
and the EU. Previous studies showed that anti-immigration attitudes and euro-
scepticism are important explanations of radical right voting. In national contexts
where the dominant public opinion is euro-sceptic and critical towards migration,
EU integration and migration are more likely perceived as threats to the nation. As
the radical right contrasts the positive aspects of the own nation with the negative
Lubbers and Coenders 103
features of perceived threats to the nation, we expect that in countries where EU
integration and migration are stronger perceived as problems, national identiﬁca-
tion will be stronger related to voting for the radical right. Given the anti-Islamic
rhetoric of many radical right parties in particular and negative public climate
towards Muslims, we also focus on the role of the dominant public opinion
towards Muslims.
Hypothesis 5a–c: The more unfavourable the public opinion climate towards (a)
migrants, (b) Muslims or (c) towards the EU, the stronger the positive eﬀect of
national identiﬁcation on the likelihood to vote for radical right parties.
Data and operationalization
Data were derived from the fourth wave of the European Values Study 2008–2010
(EVS, 2011). All European countries participated in this survey. Since we also test
for interaction eﬀects between nationalistic attitudes and the dominant public opin-
ion within a country, we included data only from countries with at least 20 radical
right-wing voters. The attitude towards the EU was not asked in Norway.
Therefore, we also dropped this country from the analysis. This left us with 20
countries (see Table 1).
Radical right-wing voting: We classiﬁed parties according to the standards in the lit-
erature, discussing which parties belong to the party–family (Immerzeel, 2015;
Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2008). Table 1 provides the table with the included coun-
tries, parties and the percentage of voters in the data.1
The question on voting behaviour tapped which party respondents had voted for
in the last national elections. Our dependent variable is dichotomous, with the
value 1 referring to a radical right-wing party vote, and the value 0 referring to
a vote for another party. People that did not vote, or reported that they did not
know which party they had voted for were excluded from the analyses. The per-
centage that claimed not to vote equals almost 25%, which is an underestimation of
non-voting. Another 9% did not know which party to vote for and around 7% did
not provide an answer.
Nationalistic attitudes: National identiﬁcation was measured with a question in which
respondents were presented ﬁve geographical units (locality or town, region, coun-
try, Europe, the world) and were asked ‘which of the geographical groups would
you say you belong to ﬁrst of all?’ and as a follow-up question ‘and secondly?’. We
distinguished between those who mentioned the country as their ﬁrst choice (i.e.
strong national identiﬁcation), as their second choice (moderate national identiﬁ-
cation) and those who did not mention their country (weak national identiﬁcation).
Although the question triggers respondents to mention a geographical group even
when they identify to none of these groups, we would anticipate that most of these
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respondents would then have missings and mentioned nothing. This was however
not the case. Figure 1 shows that national identiﬁcation is much more relevant for
European citizens than European identiﬁcation. It also shows that national iden-
tiﬁcation is particularly strong in Finland, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey.
National pride was measured with the question ‘How proud are you to be a
country citizen?’, with four answer categories, ranging from not proud at all, to
very proud. Ethnic nationalism was measured by a question introduced by the
instruction ‘Some people say the following things are important for being truly
[nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each
of the following is?’. Respondents rated the importance of various criteria from
1 (very important) to 4 (not important at all). Ethnic nationalism was indicated
Table 1. Parties classified as Radical Right and their share of voters in the European Value
Survey.
Country Acronym Party
Share
of votes
Austria FPO¨ Austrian Freedom Party; Alliance for the
Future of Austria
18.7
Belgium: Flanders VB Flemish Interest 13.8
Bulgaria ATAKA National Attack 9.1
Croatia HSP; HDSSB Croatian Party of Rights; Croatian
Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja
7.0
Denmark DF Danish People’s Party 8.7
Finland PerusS True Finns 12.3
France FN; MPF National Front; Movement for France 4.7
Germany Rep; NPD Republicans; National Democratic Party of
Germany
2.1
Greece LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally 3.4
Hungary JOBBIK Movement for a better Hungary 3.1
Italy LN; MS-FT; NF Northern League; Three-coloured Flame;
National Front
10.1
Latvia LNNK; VL For Fatherland and Freedom; All for Latvia 10.0
Netherlands PVV; TON Party for Freedom; Pride in the Netherlands 10.5
Poland LPR United Poland; League of Polish Families 3.5
Romania PRM Party for Greater Romania 6.0
Serbia SRS Serbian Radical Party 5.9
Slovak Republic SNS Slovak National Party 9.3
Slovenia SNS Slovenian National Party 10.9
Switzerland SVP Swiss People’s Party 21.0
Turkey MHP Nationalist Movement Party 7.7
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by the importance attached to having national ancestry. The other criteria people
could rate are ‘being born in the country’ and ‘to be able to speak the national
language(s)’. We also control for the criterion ‘to respect country’s political insti-
tutions and laws’. Figure 2 shows the diﬀerences between the included countries in
how the populations attach importance to these criteria for being truly a member of
the national group. In general, people attach more importance to language
and respecting the country’s political institutions and laws. In Eastern European
countries, the population makes a less clear distinction. In Bulgaria, Croatia,
0
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Naon most important Europe most important
Figure 1. National and European belonging by country.
Source: European Value Survey, 2008.
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Figure 2. Importance of national ancestry, being born in the country, speaking the language
and respecting political institutions and laws for being fully country’s national.
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Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Turkey, respondents value ancestry and
being born in the country as relevant as speaking the national language and
respecting country’s political institutions and laws. The correlations between the
three aspects of nationalistic attitudes (identiﬁcation, pride and ethnic nationalism)
are in general modest. The strongest correlation exists between national pride and
ethnic nationalism (r¼ 0.27). All other correlations are positive and signiﬁcant as
well, but are weaker in strength.
Other socio-political attitudes: In this study, we control for other attitudes that previ-
ously have been found to be central in explaining radical right support (Werts et al.,
2012). Regarding individual perceptions, ﬁrst, perceived migrant threat was mea-
sured by ﬁve bipolar items (‘immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country’
versus ‘immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country’; and in the
same bipolar manner: ‘a country’s cultural life is [not] undermined by immigrants’;
‘immigrants [do not] make crime problems worse’; ‘immigrants are [not] a strain on
a country’s welfare system’ and ‘in the future the proportion of immigrants will
[not] become a threat to society’) (Cronbach’s alpha¼ .87). We also include a meas-
urement on the attitude towards Muslims. Although this measure as a separate
motive for voters to choose the radical right has not been tested empirically very
often, we think it is relevant since many of the radical right parties demarcate the
in-group by opposing it to Muslims in European countries. Respondents were
asked about their social distance towards a variety of groups with the question
whether they would not like to have them as neighbours. When Muslims were
mentioned we coded that as social distance towards Muslims. Third, we included
euro-scepticism, measured with ﬁve items referring to fears related to the building
of the EU (‘A loss of social security’; ‘A loss of national identity and culture’; ‘Our
country paying more and more to the EU’; ‘A loss of power in the world for the
country’ and ‘A loss of jobs in the country’) (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.89). Next,
authoritarian tendencies were measured with three items asking respondents
about the preferred political system (‘having a strong leader who does not have
to bother with parliament and elections’, ‘having experts, not government, make
decisions according to what they think is best for the country’ and ‘having the army
rule the country’). The four answer categories ranged from very good to very bad,
with higher scores referring to more authoritarian tendencies (Cronbach’s
alpha¼ 0.58). Finally, we included political distrust, measured by the items ‘conﬁ-
dence in parliament’ and ‘conﬁdence in political parties’ (r¼ 0.54). All attitudes
with at least semi-interval measurement level were Z-standardized, resulting in
scales with means of zero and standard deviations of one. The online appendix
contains the descriptive statistics.
Structural background characteristics: The highest completed educational level was
measured with the international comparable ISCED (International Standard
Classiﬁcation of Education) scheme. We applied the ISCED 2-digit code and
grouped smaller categories together, resulting in 10 categories from 0 ‘pre-primary
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education or no education’ to 9 ‘second stage of tertiary education’.2 With regard
to social class, we distinguished between people presently employed and non-
employed people. For those currently employed, we applied the nominal class
typology of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (EGP, 1979). For those cur-
rently not employed, we distinguished between unemployed people and a residual
category consisting of retired people, people working in their own household and
looking after their children, students, disabled people, other social positions and
employed people whose EGP score was missing.
Finally, we included sex, age, migrant status and church attendance as control
variables in the analyses. With regard to age, a random sample of the adult popu-
lation was drawn in each country, except for Finland (18–74 years of age). To
prevent outliers on the age variable, we recoded the lower and upper values to
respectively 18 and 90 years of age. The variable migrant status distinguishes
between respondents whose parents were born in the country of residence and
ﬁrst and second generation migrants. Church attendance ranged from attending
‘(practically) never’ (1) to ‘more than once a week’ (7).
Macro level characteristics: We include the average public opinion in a country
regarding national pride, an ethnic conception of nationhood (regarding the rele-
vance of having country’s ancestry), migrant threat, distance toward Muslims and
euro-scepticism. This was calculated by aggregating the individual level attitudes to
the country level. We control for two macro-level characteristics that have been
included often in previous research: the level of unemployment and the percentage
of foreign-born population. These ﬁgures have been derived from Eurostat (2015a,
2015b). Eurostat did not provide the unemployment ﬁgures for Switzerland and
Serbia. These ﬁgures were derived from the Wordbank. It were also the countries
with lowest (3.4%) and highest (13.6%) unemployment rates, respectively. The
foreign-born population ﬁgures are available for most countries from 2009
onwards. For France, Latvia and Austria ﬁgures from 1 January 2008 were already
available, for the other countries for 2009. Exceptions are Bulgaria (2011), Slovakia
(2010) and Switzerland (2011), for which the ﬁgures had become later available.
For Turkey and Serbia, we relied on UN statistics. The foreign-born population
was largest in Switzerland (24.7%) and lowest in Romania (0.8%).
Methods and results
To account for clustering within countries, we use multilevel analysis. It estimates
the variance between countries in the extent of radical right voting. To test whether
nationalistic attitudes are associated with radical right voting, we ﬁrst build a
model not controlled for the other attitudes. We then add the attitudes that have
been found to aﬀect radical right voting in previous research, to ﬁnd out whether
the eﬀects of nationalistic attitudes remain. In a ﬁnal model, we include the random
slopes and the cross-level interactions, to test to what extent the eﬀect of national
identiﬁcation is dependent on the national public opinion.
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We ﬁrst show descriptive ﬁndings providing evidence whether under the condi-
tion of absence of national identiﬁcation and absence of patriotism, the vote for the
radical right is absent as well, and what the bivariate association is between the
nationalistic attitudes and the vote for the radical right. Figure 3 shows that
the associations between three presented nationalistic attitudes and voting for
the radical right are positive. With stronger identiﬁcation, more national pride
and more importance attached to national ancestry, support for the radical right
is stronger. The association does not seem to be very strong though, in particular
not where it concerns national identiﬁcation. Here we see that also among people
who do not mention the nation to be important, a share does support the radical
right, refuting hypothesis 1a. Radical right voting also takes place among people
with no love for the nation, contradicting our hypothesis 2a and contrasting our
expectations that national identiﬁcation and love for the country are necessary
conditions to vote for the radical right. In line with hypotheses 1b and 2, we do
ﬁnd overall positive associations between national identiﬁcation and pride and
support for the radical right.
Table 2 presents the results of the analyses, showing to what extent the attitudes
are related to radical right voting under control of each other and other charac-
teristics. Model 0 shows that there is quite some variance between the European
countries in the level of voting for the radical right, which is in line with actual
election turnouts. In Model 1, we included the nationalistic attitudes together with
the sociological background characteristics. National identiﬁcation is not related to
voting for the radical right, although its eﬀect is almost signiﬁcant. A stronger
identiﬁcation with the nation, as compared to other geographical units amongst
which the EU, does hardly increase the likelihood of a vote for the radical right.
National pride has the anticipated eﬀect, although also this eﬀect size is modest and
it is signiﬁcant only at p< .05. An ethnic deﬁnition of nationhood, by highlighting
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Figure 3. Bivariate associations between nationalistic attitudes (national identification,
national pride and national ancestry importance) and vote share for the radical right.
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Table 2. Unstandardized parameter estimates from logistic multi-level models on Radical
Right-wing voting in 20 countries.
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
b SE b SE b SE
Individual perceptions
National identification (z) .055 .029 .062* .030
National pride (z) .091* .033 .099** .033
Relevance of national
ancestry (z)
.228** .040 .112** .041
Relevance of being born in the
country (z)
.135** .038 .025 .039
Relevance of ability to speak
the national language (z)
.186** .038 .127** .038
Relevance of respecting national
institutions and law (z)
.094** .031 .064* .032
Perceived migrant threat (z) .449** .037
Social distance to Muslims .481** .067
Euro-scepticism (z) .211** .036
Authoritarianism (z) .116** .034
Political distrust (z) .275** .033
Macro-level characteristics (controls)
Level of unemployment .277** .119 .358** .128
Percentage of foreign born .194 .107 .166 .116
Individual characteristics (controls)
Educational level .067** .015 .023 .015
Social position (higher controllers ¼ ref.)
Lower controllers .154 .137 .114 .140
Routine non-manual .318 .167 .262 .170
Lower sales service .291 .170 .181 .173
Self-employed people .385* .166 .298 .170
Skilled manual workers,
supervisors
.350* .151 .215 .154
Unskilled manual workers .469** .149 .313* .153
Unemployed people .133 .172 .009 .174
Other .158 .129 .084 .132
Migrant status
No migrant (ref.)
Second generation .166 .127 .098 .129
First generation .210 .163 .123 .166
(continued)
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the relevance of national ancestry to become a truly national, aﬀects the likelihood
to vote for the radical right strongly. From the other criteria that people value
relevant to be a truly national, ‘being born in the country’ also aﬀects radical right
voting positively. The same holds for the aspect of language; voters who attach
more relevance to understanding the national language in order to be seen as a
truly national, are more likely to vote for the radical right. Attaching more import-
ance to ‘respecting political institutions and laws’ as a civic deﬁnition of nation-
hood reduces the likelihood to vote for the radical right. For the background
characteristics, this model replicates ﬁndings from earlier research, showing that
lower educated, manual workers and men are more likely to vote for the radical
right. It also shows that the older one is, the less likely it is to vote for the radical
right. People who attend church more often are less likely to vote for the radical
right. On the macro-level, we do ﬁnd, as some previous studies found as well, that
the unemployment level in a country is negatively associated with the likelihood to
vote for the radical right. The eﬀect from the percentage of foreign-born people is
positive but (just) not signiﬁcant.
In Model 2, we added the other socio-political attitudes. The question now is
whether the eﬀects of national pride and the relevance of ancestry, being born in
the country and language as criteria for nationhood remain signiﬁcant when the
major other explanations of radical right voting are included, related to threat
perceptions, authoritarianism and political distrust. Model 2 shows that perceived
migrant threat, social distance to Muslims, euro-scepticism, authoritarianism and
political distrust have the eﬀects as anticipated, of which migrant threat is the
strongest predictor. Our interest goes to the eﬀects of nationalistic attitudes.
Under control of all the socio-political attitudes, national identiﬁcation is now
(just) signiﬁcantly related to voting for the radical right, which is in line with
Table 2. Continued
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
b SE b SE b SE
Church attendance .083** .017 .064** .017
Gender: Male (female ¼ ref.) .358** .060 .366** .062
Age .012** .002 .014** .002
Intercept 2.313 0.130 1.669 .216 2.013 .224
s2u0 – level 2 variance
(countries)
0.324 0.108 0.240 .081 0.284 .096
s2e – level 1 variance
(respondents)
1.00 1.00 1.00
(z), standardized independent variable.
N¼ 15,613; **p< .01, *p< .05 (two-sided).
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hypothesis 1b. We found that the eﬀect of national pride remains (and is even
somewhat larger than in Model 1), corroborating hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3a is
also not refuted. The eﬀect of the relevance people attach to ancestry is markedly
smaller in Model 3 than in Model 2, indicating its strong relation with the other
attitudes included, but its eﬀect remains signiﬁcant. The relevance of being born in
a country for nationhood is fully explained by the included attitudes, refuting
hypothesis 3b. This does not hold for the relevance people attach to language,
that eﬀect remains, supporting H3c.
Comparing the eﬀect sizes, however, it shows that perceived migrant threat and
social distance to Muslims have the strongest contribution in explaining radical
right-wing voting. As is often argued, political distrust is a good runner-up. The
role of the nationalistic attitudes is smaller and more comparable to the role of
authoritarianism, just somewhat smaller than the eﬀect of Euroscepticism.
Concluding we can state that nationalistic attitudes do play a role in voting for
the radical right, and we also showed that national pride and ethnic conceptions of
nationhood are more important than the level of national identiﬁcation in itself,
but the direct contribution of nationalistic attitudes in explaining radical right
voting is modest.
Finally, we investigated the eﬀect of the national public opinion climate on the
relation between national identiﬁcation and voting for the radical right. Overall,
national identiﬁcation turned out to have a (small) eﬀect on radical right voting.
We also anticipated that when people identify with the nation strongly, they will
turn to radical right parties in particular when the public opinion in a country
expresses a stronger ethnic perception of the nation. We therefore included a
random slope of national identiﬁcation to model the variance in the eﬀect of
national identiﬁcation between countries. We tried to explain this variance, by
including an interaction between national identiﬁcation and the public opinion
on the relevance of national ancestry for nationhood. First, we have to conclude
that the eﬀect of this ethnic nationalistic public opinion is insigniﬁcant. The degree
to which the general public in a country adheres to a more ethnic exclusive deﬁn-
ition of nationhood is not associated with a larger likelihood to vote for the radical
right. Second, the eﬀect of national identiﬁcation is not dependent on this aggre-
gate ethnic perception of the nationhood in a country, refuting Hypothesis 4. The
ﬁnding that the eﬀect of national identiﬁcation varies across countries is hence not
due to the diﬀerences between the countries in the public opinion regarding the
ethnic conception of the nationhood. We also tested whether the eﬀect of national
identiﬁcation is stronger in countries with a public opinion that is more unfavour-
able towards migrants (level of migrant threat), or where there is on average more
social distance to Muslims and a more euro-sceptic public climate. The interactions
between national identiﬁcation and public opinion on Muslims and the EU were
not signiﬁcant (Models 3b and 3c; refuting H5b and H5c). However, as shown
in Table 3 (Model 3a), we do ﬁnd that the eﬀect of national identiﬁcation is
stronger in countries where the public perceives more migrant threat (supporting
hypothesis 5a). With a one standard deviation increase in average public opinion
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Table 3. Unstandardized parameter estimates from logistic multi-level models on radical
right-wing voting in 20 countries.
b SE b SE b SE
Individual perceptions
National identification (z) .075 .046 .073 .047 .076 .051
Country-level characteristics
Public opinion on migrant threat .133 .138
Public opinion on migrant threat
national identification
.107* .047
Public social distance to Muslims .046 .128
Public social distance to Muslims
national identification
.092 .047
Public opinion on euro-scepticism .160 .121
Public opinion on euro-scepticism
national identification
.047 .051
Intercept
s2u0 – level 2 variance (countries) .298 .100 .290 .098 .268 .091
Random slope of national identification .023 .013 .024 .013 .032 .016
s2e – level 1 variance (respondents) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Controlled for all individual level characteristics and national level of unemployment and percentage of
foreign born as displayed in Table 2.
N¼ 15,613; *p< .05 (two-sided).
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities to vote radical right as a function of national identification,
under conditions of a public opinion with low levels of perceptions of migrant threat (dashed
line) and a public opinion of high levels of perceptions of migrant threat (solid line).
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on migrant threat, the eﬀect of national identiﬁcation increases with .107. This
means that in countries where on average migrants are stronger perceived as a
threat, a solider sense of belonging to the nation is more strongly associated
with the vote for the radical right. The reverse holds for countries with a public
opinion expressing less migrant threat: there it is estimated that national identiﬁ-
cation lowers the likelihood to vote for the radical right. Figure 4 expresses this
relation between national identiﬁcation and support for the radical right in the
diﬀerent contexts of public opinion. It shows that national identiﬁcation is not
inherently related to a stronger likelihood to vote for the radical right. Only in
countries where perceptions of migrant threat are widespread among the general
public, a stronger sense of national identiﬁcation is related to a higher likelihood to
vote for the radical right
Conclusions and discussion
Radical right-wing parties campaign most strongly against immigration and Islam,
and are known for their anti-EU stances and anti-establishment rhetoric. From
that perspective, it is no surprise that previous research found repeatedly that anti-
migration attitudes, euro-scepticism and political cynicism are the strongest explan-
ations of radical right voting. However, both radical right-wing parties themselves
and social science theorists have emphasized the role of nationalist ideology. In the
nationalist ideology, the nation with its ascribed characteristics is regarded as the
key unit to structure socio-cultural life, and is opposed to larger units as the EU.
The national characteristics should, according to the nationalist ideology of the
radical right, be preserved and protected. Identity and pride in the nation, symbo-
lized by abundant presence of the ﬂag in campaign material, are at the core of the
programs. Moreover, most of the radical right parties take exclusionist stances in
their conceptions of nationhood, mostly favouring an ethnic conception. We there-
fore question to what extent voters with nationalistic attitudes were more in favour
of voting for the radical right – surprisingly hardly studied in previous research. We
ﬁnd that people who identify stronger with the nation are somewhat more likely to
vote for the radical right, but the eﬀect is small. It is questioned to what extent
people perceive themselves to belong to the nation, in competition with other (more
local or international) geographical areas. People who picked the nation as most
important to belong to are found to be more likely to vote for the radical right.
Sometimes national pride is considered as a part of national identiﬁcation as well;
our results indicate a weak correlation though between identifying stronger with
the nation and national pride. We test its eﬀect here separately and ﬁnd a (weak)
association with radical right voting; the more pride in the nation, the more likely
voters are to vote for the radical right. Finally, we distinguish between various
conceptions of nationhood. As anticipated, our ﬁndings indicate that the more
people value ancestry as relevant for nationhood, the more likely they are to
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vote for the radical right. In line with radical right parties’ rhetoric about a nation’s
shared ancestry and culture, the importance attached to speaking the national
language was also positively related to support for the radical right. These associ-
ations between national identiﬁcation, national pride and the relevance of ancestry
and language on the one hand, and radical right voting on the other hand,
remained when controlled for what turned out the strongest predictors of radical
right voting: perceived migrant threat, social distance to Muslims, political cyni-
cism and euro-scepticism.
Our results show that ﬁrstly, certain nationalistic attitudes are relevant in
explaining radical right voting, but in line with earlier research, national identiﬁ-
cation and love for the country are hardly related to expressions of intolerance.
Secondly, we ﬁnd that it is not so much the degree of national identiﬁcation that
matters, but more the extent to which people attach pride to their nation and their
ethnic or civic conception of nationhood. Thirdly, although on average the role of
nationalistic attitudes is modest, national identity is more relevant in countries with
a more negative public climate towards immigrants. Since European populations
identify stronger with the nation than for example with Europe, changes in public
opinion on migration may cause a larger shift in support for the radical right than
might be thought based solely on the larger share of the population perceiving
stronger migrant threats.
The role of nationalistic attitudes is complicated. Radical right supporters gen-
erally have exclusionist conceptions of the nation, but not always identify ﬁrst and
foremost with the nation. In that perspective they may be seen to have a negative
conception of identity (Bruter and Harrison, 2011). Often they attach more import-
ance to the region or local communities and do not express pride in the nation.
Perhaps because they long to a nostalgic construction of the nation: they are proud
of what the nation once was, not of the current state of the nation (Meuleman
and Lubbers, 2013). From the ideologies of nativism (Mudde, 2007) and multi-
pluralism (Rydgren, 2007) in which it is stated that the radical right ideologies
depart from preserving the unique characteristics of the nation and protect it to
possible threats, in particular the part describing the threats turn out the most
relevant in explaining radical right voting. Threat from migration and Muslims
and threats from the EU, next to political distrust, remain the most important
predictors of voting for the radical right. For radical right voters, nationhood is
strongly deﬁned in terms of ancestry and speaking the country’s language. But this
latter criterion resonates among a much broader public than among the radical
right’s electorate only.
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Notes
1. The data are from 2008. This implies that the Greek Golden Dawn was not relevant yet.
For the UK, the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party
(UKIP) could not be derived since these were merged in the category ‘other’. For
Belgium, we only included the Flemish region and with that excluding the Belgian
Front National.
2. The categories are ‘pre-primary education or no education’ (0), ‘primary education or
first stage of basic education’ (1), ‘lower secondary or second stage of basic education’ (2),
‘pre-vocational or pre-technical (upper) secondary education’ (3), ‘vocational or technical
(upper) secondary education’ (4), ‘general (upper) secondary education ‘(5), ‘post-second-
ary non-tertiary education’ (6), ‘first stage of tertiary education (vocational)’ (7), ‘first
stage of tertiary education (general)’ (8) and ‘second stage of tertiary education’ (9). We
treated educational level as an interval variable since there were no relevant deviations
from linearity.
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